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DISCUSSION: WATER RESOURCES
Background of the Pelton Dam case.
Discussion of the Implied Reservation Doctrine
as it affects future use and disposal
of public lands.
Circumvention of the reservation doctrine.

MR. CORKER: (Oral remarks supplementing his paper) In 1955, the United States Supreme Court upheld,
against the objections of the State of Oregon, the licensing of
a hydro-electric project of Portland General Electric Company
on a river. It was probably a navigable river, but the general
counsel of the Federal Power Commission wanted to make a
little law and so did not present any findings that it was navigabli, and so based his case solely on the predicate federal
power under the statutes, which became applicable on the basis
of the abutment of the dam on federally reserved lands. My
work for the Public Land Law Review Commission permitted
an examination of the briefs and the arguments in that case,
and I would like to say to you that I think Oregon's argument
was very unfortunate. In essence, the argument was that a constitutional power was vested in the State of Oregon which prevented Congress from doing what the Court said the Federal
Power Commission had been authorized by Congress to do;
namely, to build a dam under federal license. To this grant of
power the State of Oregon objected. There were no vested
water rights asserted. There was no compensation asked for.
There was no compensation that could have been awarded
even if it had been asked for. The decision I think was one that
is subject of criticism. I join in criticizing it. The decision was
a matter of construction under the Federal Power Act which
Congress was free to amend. Senator Richard Neuberger of
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Oregon proposed amendments. Congress had no enthusiasm
for those amendments. After 15 years, I think that the decision, but only as an example of statutory construction, is
pretty sound law.
MR. BARRY: I had something to do with the reservation
doctrine when I was with the Department of Interior. There
is a very large amount of confusion involved in the reservation doctrine. Now, I do think, and this is something I say
with deference and respect, that the Pelton Dam case is a case
involving the reservation doctrine. My theory is that the
Federal Power Act gives to the Federal Power Commission
the authority to license dams on public lands, reservations,
navigable waters of the United States and waters that affect
the navigable waters of the United States. Now, if that is a
constitutional law, and I am fully convinced that it is, and I
am sure that John Carver will agree with me, the doctrine has
been in operation long enough to be tested. If that is a constitutional act of the United States, then no law of any state can
interfere with it. It is a supremacy case. The Pelton Dam case
simply says there were no private rights involved. Nobody
claiming a private right sought intervention. The only one
who tried to intervene was Portland General Electric. It was
solely a contest between the United States and the State of
Oregon as to who had the jurisdiction to decide what was going
to happen to that river. All the court held was that the United
States law was supreme. The Act of the Federal Power Commission, who licensed the dam, was valid.
I realize that there could be a question of reservation
rights in the Pelton Dam case. However, I am sure that the
water rights used by Portland General Electric had been acquired by them. I do not think they got their rights by virtue
of the license. I am quite sure that in the FirstIowa case and
the Grand River Dam case that the water rights of the downstream appropriators and users, which were lost when the
areas were flooded, would have to be paid for under the Federal Power Act. Likewise, in the Pelton Dam case the water
rights would have to be paid for.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss1/14
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I do not want to express so much my own views on this
subject, which happen to be generally in support of the reservation doctrine as expressed in Arizona v. California and in
the Winters case, but I do want to point out that I do not really
think that the reservation doctrine means all the things that
people say it does. For example, some people contend that just
because 60 per cent of the water falls upon the national forest,
the United States owns that water. The United States only
owns sufficient water to carry out the purposes of the reservation. One of the reasons forests were set aside was to preserve water for all kinds of downstream users. If someone has
a pre-reservation right that they acquired for the use of water
under state law, the 1886 Act makes that right a property right
which cannot be terminated without compensation. Do I agree
with you on that, Mr. Trelease ?
MR. TRELEASE: Yes. As a matter of fact I left a sentence out when I presented my paper. The chiller, this idea
of the 61 per cent, seems based on the utmost extension of the
doctrine to reservation of all water "arising on" reserved
lands (the de minimis refresher on the reservation of water
only for "intended reservation purposes").
MR. BARRY: The source of this misconception can be
found in the brief that Bill Peters filed in the case out in California where he implied that all the water that falls upon reserved lands belongs to the United States. This has never
been the claim of the Department of Interior.
Now there are questions that involve the navigational
servitude, but these are different cases too; for example, the
Gerlach and the Kansas City Life Insurance Company cases.
I quite agree with John Carver that west of the 98th meridian
it would be appropriate to subordinate the navigational servitude to al these other uses of the land. There really is not
much navigation on the rivers west of the 98th meridian. The
O'Mahoney-Milligan Amendment which was introduced in
Section 1 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 provided that west
of the 98th meridian the federal navigation servitude is waived
in favor of all these other uses. I woud say that that would be
an appropriate thing to do under the circumstances. Even in
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Gerlach where the court was dealing with a non-navigable
part of the San Joaquin River, it was decided there would be
no compensation for some people although water was taken
from them and given to someone else.
There is no statute that really covers this reservation
doctrine. I think it is important that we should give some consideration to it. There should be a statute that leaves it up to
more than the whim of Congress to take care of people in the
Gerlach sitaution. The Central Valley Project Act relied
heavily on the legislative history in the Gerlach case to find
compensation or compensable rights for these people.
Now, there is one other thing about these cases. First of
all, I want to say this about what the reservation doctrine is.
The reservation doctrine is what was spelled out in the Winters
case. Certain Indians on the Milk River Reservation in Montana had made a treaty with the United States, and had given
up a great deal of their land, and as a result were confined to
a smaller area. The Supreme Court reasoned that we could
have suggested that these people give up their nomadic hunting life and go to agriculture. This would have meant that they
would get this little parcel of land with no water rights with
which to conduct their agriculture enterprise. This is the
rationale of the Winters case. Now that is a far cry from the
Pelton Dam case, but it is not a far cry from the reservation
doctrine of the Arizona v. Californiacase, where the federal
government said the United States has a reservation for a
wildlife refuge. You need water for a wildlife refuge. The
government has a water right for so much water as of the date
the refuge was established. This is what these two cases held.
Strictly speaking that is what we are talking about in the reservation doctrine.
It would be important if Congress were to spell out something like an articulated statement which must be made at the
time the reservation is establised. I do not believe, however,
that we ought to compensate people for the past, that is, to pay
them for rights they never had.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss1/14
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I would like to point out one thing more. There is something that they call county of origin and state of origin. I
come from Arizona. I am now recently from Oregon. I have
written to my friends, including Bob Clark in Arizona,
and told them to keep their "cotton picking hands" off
the Columbia River. But in what sense is the water in Oregon
private property? I do not think there was any private property involved in the issues, but in what respect does the Fifth
Amendment apply to any water in Oregon that is not yet
appropriated and might be taken to Arizona ? The question is:
will there be a county of origin doctrine recognized by the
United States? It is now recognized in policy. The bills that
are considered in Congress which intend to import water from
one area to another always provide that there will be a fund
established that will bring water to that area if the area ever
needs it, but apparently it appears that it will be considered
surplus now, and that Congress can take it, if it needs it, now.
This concept is also different from the reservation doctrine.
It might be well to spell out in some statute that whenever
water is taken away from a county or a state under the state
of origin doctrine, that there will be some provesion in the act
to compensate the states for what they have lost.
I think that most of the cases that are cited, including the
Rio Grande case, did not deal with reservation doctrine, but
they did sugest something that Congress never considered
again. The Rio Grande case said that all of the public lands
were held under the riparian doctrine, and that Congress
did not intend, in the 1866 Act when they let people acquire
lands and water rights, to take away the riparian right on the
public lands which are not reservations. Congress has not
carried that doctrine over. If they had, the doctrine might be
much more onerous than it is now.
I would think that much of this is a tempest in a teapot.
Mr. Carver indicated in one particular instance that it would
not be worth a study. Nobody has, of course, been hurt by the
reservation doctrine. When the courts get down to deciding
the issue, all they say is so much water is reserved for any
federal reservation as is required for that reservation. How
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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much do you need for a park ? Not much. How much do you
need for a forest or wildlife refuge ? Quite a bit. You need to
fix the quantity as of the date of acquisition. We suggested
in the Department of Interior that a bill be passed requiring
us to give notice of how much water would be taken in the
event we had to take someone else's appropriated water. We
always took the view that we would pay for it, because they
had valid rights under state law. This takes care of the compensation aspect of it. I have always found the problem to be
very simple. Maybe it is because I am too dense to notice the
subtleties, but I really think that it is very simple.
MR. MARTZ: Let me take a couple of minutes to respond.
First, philosophically, it seems to me that the government,
whether it be federal or state, exists for the people. It does not
exist as an entity for itself. Its interest should be the people's
interests, as this is so well stated in the preliminary chapters of
the Public Land Law Review Commission's Report.
Water is wasted if it is not used. It is in the national interest that water be effectively used. Water reserved for some
potential or future use is lost to our economy. It cannot be
used unless substantial investments are made. It is not, therefore, in the interest of the United States as a federal entity
to do anything that impairs the utilization of the nonrenewable resources of the United States.
To make water resources useable, we have to have the title
to water secured in the user. This requires knowing what the
burdens on the stream may be. It also requires a uniform system of administration. It may be a nit of water or a magnitude of water that is not used. I know for a fact that it is a
matter of great concern to the oil shale industry on the Colorado River and in the White River Basin in making their plans
for the development of reservoirs and water supplies for
future uses. This is so because of the uncertainty as to what
the federal load on the stream may be, because of the openended reservation doctrine. Now if it is a simple thing and if
it does not require sacrifice of much in the way of potential
future uses of the United States, then it seems to me this is all
the more reason that we should have quantification and unihttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss1/14
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form administration. Quantification, as practiced in the federal departments, is self serving because of the concern that
every man in government has about claiming too little under
laws and court decisions which give a property interest to the
United States in water. This is why the Commission has suggested administrative positions must be subject to accountability.
In the recommendations that we made to the Commission
a year and one-half ago in urging quantification and adjudication under state laws we did two things. One, we required
initiation by the apropriate agency in determining what the
present and foreseeable needs for water on the various sources
of supply might be. Rather than to simply allow a statement
of quantities without review of it, we would require an indication and accountability for the present and potential needs
for the water. The Commission has recommended state and
local government participation in an advisory way, but has
reserved to itself all of the decision-making authority. I have
serious reservations about this statement of policy. I can see
no justification for the existence of a federal entity that is
going to act as an entity, separate and apart from the region
of the users, unless there is a defined and independent federal
interest to protect. In the area of water administration, I do
not see that any such interest exists. It is in the interest of the
United States to have the water put to beneficial use. The
states have fairly well-established systems for the allocation
of water. Some work more efficiently than others, others do
not work too efficiently at this time, but, nevertheless, they
exist. For the United States to say we have an unquantified
amount of water that is not going to be subject to administration by the state, is a burden upon the utilization of water,
and a burden upon private rights.
On the constitutional question, I think it is a boot strap
argument to say that if the water is reserved to the United
States, it belongs to the United States, and obviously compensation does not have to be paid for its later use. But, if we
have a regimen upon a stream administered both by the federal and state authorities that not only permits but encourages
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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the investment of capital for the development and utilization of
water resources, I think that there is an economic interest
that deserevs protection in the national interest; and that compensation should be made for changing the regimen because
of possible later use of the reserve water.
MR. BARRY: There is just one question that I do not
understand that I think needs some clarification. We did a
lot of planning in respect to the development of the oil shale
resources in the Colorado plateau. We always assumed, and
I have never heard it said at any time that this assumption is
not correct, that if an oil shale industry was to develop there
and needed water that they would have to buy that water from
downstream users and pay for it. Now, is there any change ?
If there has been, I have not heard of it.
MR. TRELEASE: That was just a suggestion that the
reservation might have the water there.
MR. BARRY: Maybe it is only a suggestion, but it is
typical of the misconceptions that people have. This is comparable to the idea that maybe all the water that falls on the
forest is reserved to the government. We have had days and
days of hearings that reiterated that this is not what the reservation doctrine is about.
MR. TRELEASE: Well, Frank, you state exactly what
the reservation doctrine means and you say its effect is de
minimis. Government lawyers do not speak of it in exactly
the same way. If you would have stopped after your first
couple of paragraphs, you would have dictated a wonderful
opinion for the Pelton Dam case, and it was too bad that you
were not clerking for the Supreme Court when the Pelton
Dam case was decided. I think that it was Winston Churchill
who wrote a history of the United States based on the proposition that the South had won the Civil War. In the same light,
I think it would be worthwhile speculating, and as a matter
of fact I think you were doing it in part, what would have
happened if your opinion would have prevailed in the Pelton
Dam case?
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss1/14
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MR. BARRY: All I am saying is that there is not a word
about water rights in that opinion.
MR. MARTZ: Isn't it fair to say that the problem with
the Pelton Dam case is not in the holding but in the dictum.
The Supreme Court did say, did it not, that the reservation of
land reserves the water?
MR. CLARK: I would like to say something that relates
to the nature of this chapter, particularly in regard to the
brevity of the chapter. First of all, it is kind of repetitious.
You must be aware of the fact that a new commission, the
National Water Commission, has been established. The Public
Land Law Review Commission knew that the National Water
Commission was mandated to take up these particular problems. We tried to narrow the question as much as we could
in order to be clear about what little we could be clear about.
We had long and serious arguments about what the reservation doctrine meant. A lot of it was real nonsense. One of
the things that was overlooked was that the California court
in the PortlandCement case did not say that the United States
in the previous years had given up all interest in water on the
public land. It never said that, although lawyers have been
saying for 50 years that the court said that. Now the same
things apply to the Pelton Dam case. People have been saying
what the Pelton Dam case said, but the Pelton Dam case does
not involve water rights and that is an accurate statement.
This Report that we have in front of us says some things that
many of you are going to say that it does not say. However,
we are being very clear about what the Pelton Dam case does
not say. This is important because the Pelton Dam case is the
case that got everyone upset about what it did not say.
MR. CARMICH-AEL: I am very bothered by the phrase
that I have heard mentioned throughout this discussion. This
is the concept that a resource is wasted if it is not used. That
is the way my five year old son looks at a cookie jar. It strikes
me to some extent that that is the philosophy that is underlying the Commission's Report and certainly some of the thinking that has been expressed here. "Wasted if not used" makes
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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some sense if it is applied to a flow resource, such as water.
But, in "use," presently, you are talking about pollution and
certainly about fixing allocation by virtue of massive capital
investment.
MR. MARTZ: I certainly did not exclude non-economic
uses, that is non-business uses, from the category of beneficial
use. Water that is available for a use that is not practically
susceptible to use because of some government rule or policy I
say is waste. If you can satisfy us that there are non-economic,
non-business uses being made, environment aesthetics and all
that, then these are uses. They are values. They are in the
cost-benefit ratio analysis.
MR. CARMICHAEL: In some senses I am also talking
about the fixity of patterns of resource allocations which, in
essence, conceive only short term ends.
MR. CLYDE: I think that you have to break this problem
down into two things. I think all of you know where we have
been and I think we are a little bit concerned about where we
are going. I think that almost all the water projects that are
yet to be built are going to be quite expensive and will require
a rather large capital outlay. Anyone who embarks on such
a project will want to know that he has an assured water right.
I do not think that he will care so much if it is governed under
a federal or state statute as long as he has some method by
which he can determine what he is entitled to use and how he
can protect the water rights for the future.
The statement that no one has been hurt by reservation
doctrine is probably only partially true. We have circumvented it in a multitude of ways. In the Central Utah project
we have a river called the Duchene River. Farmers around
that river now have an adequate water right without building
storage. There are about 30,000 acres of Indian land not yet
developed, which, under the Winter's doctrine, can be. If the
Indians develop this other 30,000 acres of land, they could require the water. The farmers who settled on this reservation
about 1900 would be without water. One of the reasons we are
building the Central Utah project is to store water so that the
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss1/14
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white settlers will have water when the Indians develop their
use. The Indians have agreed to defer their use until about the
year 2000, by which time another phase of the project will replace it. This is a case where a very heavy portion of the cost
is being funded by the federal government. In the future I
certainly think that Congress ought to remove the impediments to the state control on the solution of these problems. I
basically favor that simply because the water that is outstanding was acquired there. We have a very viable state system.
To impose a dual system on it would present problems that we
would equally want to avoid. If there is going to be a federally
imposed statute or solution, I think we, at least, need definiteness. The method must insure that what is already done can
be quantified; and that water rights can be acquired in the
future free of the implied reservation doctrine, free of the
navigational servitude, and the other clouds that make development impossible.
The farmer or the industrialist who wants to develop does
not care where the ultimate power lies, whether it be in the
federal government or the state. He wants it resolved as a
matter of policy so that he has a reasonable definiteness and
certainty in the future. He wants to know what he can do to
protect the water right in the future. Anything less than that
leaves these two competing dual systems in competition with
each other, which leaves so many voids and uncertainties that
needed projects could not get off the ground.
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